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LECTURE
FROM MARBURY v. MADISON TO BUSH
v. GORE: 200 YEARS OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN THE UNITED STATES
Delivered by Stephen R. Altont
Judicial Review is the foundation of the rule of law in the United States. In
this Lecture, the author examines the history and theory of judicial review in
the United States as well as certain aspects of the development of the doctrine
by the United States Supreme Court. The author uses the case of Bush v.
Gore as a recent illustration of the practice of judicial review, and he con-
cludes with some general observations about judicial review and the rule of
law in the United States.
The author delivered this Lecture in April 2001 at People's University Law
School and at Peking University Law School, both in Beijing, China. This
Lecture was designed to give the author's Chinese audiences an introduction
to judicial review in the United States. China's legal system does not include
an institution that is comparable to American judicial review, and the Chinese
audiences found the institution interesting. The Chinese translation of this
Lecture is scheduled to be published by the Wuhan University Law Review
during 2002.t
Judicial review is the power of the United States federal courts to
invalidate governmental actions, including statutes enacted by the leg-
islative branch, on the ground that they are inconsistent with the
United States Constitution. In a larger sense, the topic of this Lecture
is the rule of law, for which judicial review forms the basis in the
United States.
This Lecture consists of three parts. In the first part, I will lay out
the background behind judicial review in the United States-the his-
tory, the theory, and the constitutional structure. In the second part
of this Lecture, I will discuss some of the major United States Su-
preme Court cases that established and developed the doctrine of ju-
dicial review. In the third, and final, part, I will present the recent
case of Bush v. Gore1 as an example of the major points that have
t Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law; Fulbright Profes-
sor of Law, Wuhan University School of Law, Wuhan, China (Spring 2001). A.B.,
Harvard College; J.D., University of Texas; LL.M., Columbia University. The author
gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the Editors and Staff of the Texas Wesleyan
Law Review in the preparation of this Lecture for publication. The author also is
grateful to the Editors of the Texas Wesleyan Law Review for their interest in publish-
ing the English-language version of this Lecture.
f Stephen R. Alton, From Marbury v. Madison to Bush v. Gore: 200 Years of
Judicial Review in the United States, WUHAN U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002) (transla-
tion by Mr. Guo Shu Li with publication guidance from Professor Yu Minyou, Faculty
of Law, Wuhan University School of Law).
1. 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000).
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been developed earlier. Finally, I will conclude with some general ob-
servations about judicial review and the rule of law in the United
States.
I.
Before we speak of the power of judicial review itself, some histori-
cal and theoretical background is in order. The founders of the Amer-
ican Republic, particularly the framers (drafters) of the United States
Constitution, mistrusted governmental power. They had in mind the
example of the English government. They believed that the King and
the Parliament had become too powerful and had sought to deprive
them of their natural rights. Because of this, they had declared their
independence from England in 1776.
Thomas Jefferson's Declaration of Independence drew heavily on
the natural rights philosophy of the English political philosopher John
Locke. According to Locke, all people possess certain basic or natural
rights that include the right to life, liberty, and property. Locke be-
lieved that the purpose of government is to protect these natural
rights. When the government fails in this purpose-when it breaches
the social contract from which it draws its legitimacy-the governed
have the right to withdraw their consent and to form a new govern-
ment that will fulfill its part of the social contract and protect the peo-
ple's basic rights.2
For John Locke in the 17th Century, the ideas of natural rights and
the social contract were only theoretical. But for Thomas Jefferson
and the generation who declared American independence from En-
gland in the 18th Century, these ideas were reality. In Jefferson's
words of 1776, Locke's "natural rights" to "life, liberty, and property"
became the "unalienable rights" to "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness."3 Because the English government had become destruc-
tive of these rights, the Americans were withdrawing their consent to
be governed by England and were forming their own government-
the government of a new nation. For the first time in recorded politi-
cal history, John Locke's social contract theory was being put into
practice.
The key question that the American people had to answer in the
years immediately following their Declaration of Independence was
this: What type of new government should they devise to govern
them? This was an exceedingly difficult issue in the years between
1776, when they declared their independence, and 1788, when they
ratified their constitution establishing the new form of government.
The founders of the American Republic wanted to ensure that the
2. See generally JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT chs. IX,
XIX (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Liberal Arts Press 1952) (1690).
3. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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new national government would be powerful enough to deal with the
nation's problems. But, keeping in mind their experience with the En-
glish government, they did not want their national government to be
so powerful that it would threaten the American people's natural
rights.
In 1787, a number of these men met in Philadelphia, then the na-
tion's capital, and drafted the United States Constitution. The Consti-
tution created a new and ingenious system of governing what was, by
Western European standards, a geographically large nation. The Con-
stitution established a federal system of government whereby the
states retained their sovereignty, including all powers not delegated in
the Constitution to the new national government. The national gov-
ernment, though supreme, was one of limited powers. It possessed
only those powers listed or enumerated in the Constitution-those
powers delegated to it by the people. This federal system, with the
national (federal) government exercising only the enumerated powers
delegated to it, was one means that the Constitution's framers used to
ensure that the national government would not become so strong that
it would threaten the rights of the governed.
The other means used by the Constitution's framers to ensure that
the national government would not violate the natural rights of the
people was the structure of the national government that was estab-
lished under the Constitution. Drawing heavily from the philosophy
of the 18th Century French political philosopher Baron de Montes-
quieu, the framers divided or separated the powers of the national
government among three branches of government. The legislative
branch-the Congress-would make the laws. The executive
branch-led by the President-would execute the laws. And the judi-
cial branch-the courts-would interpret the laws. This separation of
powers among the three branches of the federal government was, in
the words of James Madison, "essential to the preservation of lib-
erty."4 Madison was the primary drafter of the United States Consti-
tution and is known as "the father of the Constitution." To Madison
and the other framers, Montesquieu's separation of powers theory
was the best means of keeping any one branch of the federal govern-
ment from accumulating so much power that it would overwhelm the
other branches-and overwhelm the people's freedoms.5
But Madison and the other authors of the United States Constitu-
tion went beyond Montesquieu's separation of powers theory. Not
only should the powers of government be separated or divided among
the three branches of their national government, but each branch
should have certain powers that would balance and check the powers
of the other two branches. Said Madison, "the great security against a
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 261 (James Madison) (Garry Wills, ed., Bantam
Books 1982).
5. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
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gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department,
[i.e., branch] consists in giving to those who administer each depart-
ment, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to re-
sist encroachments of the others .... Ambition must be made to
counteract ambition." 6
So, the powers of the federal government would be separated and
distributed among its three branches. To the extent practicable, each
branch would be given roughly equal governmental power as com-
pared with the power of the other two branches. And each branch
would possess certain unique powers that checked the powers of the
other two branches. This elaborate governmental structure created by
the Constitution would help to guarantee the rights of the governed
by preventing undue concentration of governmental power in any one
branch. As Madison observed,
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels
were to govern men, neither external nor internal controuls on gov-
ernment would be necessary. In framing a government which is to
be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this:
You must first enable the government to controul the governed; and
in the next place, oblige it to controul itself.7
What were these "controuls" about which Madison wrote? What
were these checks that he and the other framers of the Constitution
built into the national government's three branches? I would like
briefly to discuss some of the most important of each branch's checks
on the others.
Article I creates the United States Congress8 and endows it with its
famous enumerated powers.9 However, Congress's power to legislate
is checked by the President's power to veto legislation.1" If the Presi-
dent vetoes a bill passed by both houses of Congress after it is
presented to him, the bill will not become law, unless the Congress
exercises its counter-check on the President's veto power.11 That is, if
at least two-thirds of the members of each house of Congress vote to
enact the bill over the President's veto, the veto is said to be overrid-
den, and the bill becomes law despite the prior veto.' 2 In the legisla-
tive realm, the presidential veto power, coupled with the Congress's
power to override a veto, is the most important pair of checks be-
tween the legislative and executive branches of the federal
government.
6. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 4, at 262.
7. Id.
8. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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The legislative branch-the Congress-possesses another important
check against, not only the executive branch, but also the judicial
branch of the government. Article II gives the Congress the power to
remove the President, the Vice President, and all civil officers of the
United States by means of the impeachment and removal process set
out in Article 1.13 This impeachment and removal power includes the
power to remove federal judges from their benches. If a majority of
the House of Representatives votes to impeach one of these officers
1 4
and two-thirds of the Senate votes to remove the officer,15 he or she is
removed from office.1 6 This power is the ultimate legislative check
against the other two branches of the federal government.
Article II creates the United States President' 7 and endows him
with certain powers, 8 including the power to make certain appoint-
ments.19 According to Article II, the President appoints the ambassa-
dors to foreign nations, the executive officers of the federal
government, and the federal judges.20 But this appointment power of
the President is checked by the United States Senate's power to con-
firm-or refuse to confirm-the President's appointments to these
posts.2' Article II gives the Senate another important check over the
President's powers, this in the area of foreign affairs. While the Presi-
dent has the power to make treaties with other nations, these treaties
will become valid as United States law only if and when two-thirds of
the Senate votes to ratify them.22
Now, let us turn to the checks involving the federal judiciary. Arti-
cle III of the Constitution creates the judicial branch of the federal
government.23 Article III, Section 2 gives the federal courts broad,
though limited, jurisdiction to decide certain "cases and controver-
sies. ' '1 4 Section 1 of Article III specifies a federal judge's term in of-
fice; judges "shall hold their Offices during good Behavior. ' 25 So,
unlike the President and the members of Congress, United States
judges do not serve for a given term of years nor do the judges stand
for periodic election to their positions. Instead, as Article II makes
13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (referencing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3,
cl. 6-7).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
17. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.




23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Article III, Section 1 expressly creates only the
United States Supreme Court, but it gives Congress the power to create "such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Id.
24. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) (interpreting
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2).
25. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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clear, federal judges are appointed by the President, subject to confir-
mation by the United States Senate.26 Moreover, these judges serve
until either they decide to retire, they die, or they are removed from
office through the Congress's Article I impeachment and removal pro-
cess. The presidential appointment process and the Congressional re-
moval process are the only two constitutional checks possessed by
these two branches against the federal judiciary. Because the federal
judiciary is the only branch of the three that is not subject to election,
it is essentially an undemocratic branch of a democratic government.
One might call it an unrepresentative branch in a representative
government.
The framers of the United States Constitution debated as to how
federal judges should be selected. Ultimately, the framers decided
against the election of judges and in favor of the judges' appointment
for life, which is what "during good Behavior"27 has come to mean.
The framers believed that there was a pressing need for judicial inde-
pendence from the other two branches of the federal government. An
independent judiciary would be better able to exercise its own check
over the two elected branches of government. Drawing on the words
of the framer Alexander Hamilton, the judges' lifetime tenure was
"essential to the faithful performance ' 28 of their "arduous duty"29 as
the "bulwarks of a limited constitution. 30 Lifetime judicial tenure
gives the federal judges the independence necessary to review and
check the actions of the other two branches of the federal government
and the actions of the state governments as well.
But what of judicial review-this check that the federal courts pos-
sess over the legislative and executive branches of the federal govern-
ment? Unlike the Congress's impeachment and removal power, the
President's appointment power, or the President's veto power coupled
with the Congress's power to override the veto, the power of judicial
review is not specified in the Constitution. Nowhere in this document
does it say, in so many words, that the federal courts have the power
to review the actions of the other two branches for their consistency
with the Constitution and to invalidate those governmental actions
that the courts find to be unconstitutional. Article III, Section 1 cre-
ates the United States Supreme Court and gives Congress the author-
ity to create lower federal courts.3 Article III, Section 2 enumerates
federal court jurisdiction3 2 and apportions it between the Supreme
Court and any lower federal courts that the Congress may choose to
26. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
27. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.




31. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
32. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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create.33 But nowhere in Article III-or anywhere else in the Consti-
tution-does it expressly grant to the federal courts the power of judi-
cial review. Instead, this most important check possessed by the
judiciary has come to be exercised only because the United States Su-
preme Court itself has decided that the federal judiciary indeed pos-
sesses this power. The Supreme Court has established this power
through its interpretation of the Constitution. I will spend the rest of
my time today discussing how the Supreme Court came to interpret
the Constitution in this way, and I will give some later examples of the
problems and consequences surrounding judicial review.
II.
As I have said earlier, Article III, Section 2 provides for broad-but
limited-jurisdiction of the federal courts. According to Section 2,
United States courts have jurisdiction over nine categories of cases
and controversies. 34 The three most important of these categories in
everyday practice are the following: (1) the power to decide contro-
versies between citizens of different states; (2) the power to decide
controversies in which the United States itself is a party; and (3) the
power to decide cases "arising under this Constitution, the laws of the
United States,"35 and United States treaties. For our purposes today,
it is this third category-particularly, the power to decide cases arising
under the Constitution-that is the most important, for the Supreme
Court has found this to be the basis for judicial review.
Before talking more about judicial review itself, I would like to con-
tinue talking for a few minutes about federal jurisdiction under Arti-
cle Ill-that is, the power of the federal judges to decide certain types
of cases and controversies that are properly before the courts. If a
case does not fit within one of the nine categories set out in Section 2
of Article III (as modified by the 11th Amendment), a federal court is
said to lack "subject matter jurisdiction" and cannot consider the mat-
ter.36 Under these circumstances-where a federal court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction in the case-no federal judicial review could take
place because the court cannot consider the matter.
But even if a case falls within one of Article III, Section 2's nine
categories, a federal court might nevertheless lack the power to decide
it. Why? Because the Supreme Court has interpreted Article III, Sec-
tion 2 to contain certain implied prerequisites that must be met in
order for a federal court to decide the case. Without meeting these
implied prerequisites, the case is said to be "non-justiciable" and must
be dismissed. So, what are these additional prerequisites to a federal
33. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
34. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
35. Id.
36. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICrION 247-51 (2d ed.
1994).
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court decision in a case-for the matter to be "justiciable?" There are
a number of these, and I will briefly discuss several of the most impor-
tant ones.
Article III, Section 2 limits federal court jurisdiction to actual cases
or controversies.37 In the United States, with our adversarial system
of justice, the Supreme Court has interpreted this constitutional lan-
guage to mean that there must be an actual case or controversy be-
tween two parties with truly adverse interests. Without a live case or
controversy between two such parties, a federal court must dismiss the
case for lack of justiciability. For example, a federal court may not
decide a case where the complaining party, the plaintiff, has not suf-
fered any harm or injury. Where the party bringing suit has not been
harmed, however slightly, by the defendant's actions, the plaintiff is
said to lack "standing" to bring the suit, and a federal court may not
consider the merits of the case.38
A second set of these prerequisites for justiciability involves the
timing of the lawsuit. If the harm to the plaintiff has not yet occurred
and may or may not occur in the future, the case is said to be "un-
ripe." A federal court may not decide unripe cases.39 On the other
end of the time spectrum, a federal court lacks the authority to decide
a case where the plaintiff's harm has already been remedied. Such
cases are said to be "moot."4 All of this is simply to say that a federal
court must decide an actual, live case or controversy-not one that
may or may not occur in the future, nor one that has occurred in the
past but in which the plaintiff's harm has already been remedied.
A third prerequisite for a federal court to decide a case involves the
so-called "political question" doctrine. If the text or the structure of
the United States Constitution commits determination of the contro-
versy to one of the other two branches of the federal government,
then the federal judge may not hear the case and must dismiss it. The
Supreme Court has developed a number of tests for determining
whether the federal courts must dismiss a case because it involves a
non-justiciable political question.4 Most of these tests more or less
37. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
38. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). "As an aspect of justiciability, the stand-
ing question is whether the plaintiff has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to
justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf." Id. at 498-99.
39. Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S.
222 (1954). "Determination of the scope and constitutionality of legislation in ad-
vance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case involves too
remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function." Id. at
224.
40. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). "'[Flederal courts are without
power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before
them."' Id. at 316 (quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971)).
41. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). According to the Baker Court, there is
a six-factor test for political questions:
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come down to whether the issue is one that either the constitutional
text or the constitutional structure of our government suggests should
be decided by one of the two elected branches of the federal govern-
ment. I will have more to say about the political question doctrine
when I discuss Bush v. Gore42 later in this presentation.
These justiciability doctrines-these additional prerequisites for a
federal court to hear and to decide the merits of a case-work with
Article III, Section 2's subject matter jurisdiction requirements to
limit the role of an unelected federal judiciary in a democratic govern-
ment. As we have seen, this matter was a subject of some debate
among the Constitution's framers. And it has been the subject of
some concern for the federal courts as well. As the United States Su-
preme Court said in 1869 in the case of Ex parte McCardle,43 "judicial
duty is not less fitly performed by declining ungranted jurisdiction
than in exercising firmly that which the Constitution and the laws
confer."44
Armed with this knowledge of some of the most important constitu-
tional limitations on a federal court's power to decide cases, let us turn
to judicial review itself. Suppose there is a case properly filed in fed-
eral court over which the court has jurisdiction and which is justicia-
ble. For example, let us suppose that the defendant is an agency of the
federal government that is charged with enforcing a federal statute
regulating plaintiff's conduct. Plaintiff is harmed in some way by the
agency's enforcement of this statute and claims that both the statute
and the agency's actions to enforce it are unconstitutional. After due
consideration of the case, our hypothetical federal judge decides that
the plaintiff is correct; the federal statute in question and its enforce-
ment by the agency are unconstitutional and therefore invalid. What
gives our federal judge the power to engage in this exercise, judicial
review?
As I have said, the power of judicial review is found nowhere in the
Constitution-at least, not expressly. However, writing in support of
ratification of the Constitution, Alexander Hamilton argued that cer-
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and man-
ageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without ex-
pressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronounce-
ments by various departments on one question.
Id. at 217.
42. 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000).
43. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
44. Id. at 515.
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tainly the federal courts would possess this authority. Quoting
Hamilton:
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of
the courts. A constitution is in fact, and must be, regarded by the
judges as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascer-
tain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act pro-
ceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an
irreconcileable [sic] variance between the two, that which has the
superior obligation and validity ought of course to be preferred; or
in other words, the constitution ought to be preferred to the statute
45
Hamilton concluded that "[n]o legislative act therefore contrary to the
constitution can be valid."' 46 In the process of making his arguments
about judicial review, Hamilton rejected the claim made by some po-
litical leaders that each branch of the federal government would have
the power to decide for itself the constitutionality of its actions with-
out the interference of the other two branches of government. 7
Fifteen years later, in 1803, the United States Supreme Court was
presented with a live case that allowed it to decide this issue. In the
celebrated case of Marbury v. Madison,48 the great chief justice, John
Marshall, reached the same conclusion as Hamilton about the federal
courts' power of judicial review, using Hamilton's reasoning. Marbury
v. Madison is among a handful of the most important decisions ever
issued by the United States Supreme Court. The case established
once and for all the principle of judicial review as a matter of constitu-
tional law.49 In the process, the decision made the judiciary a co-equal
branch of the federal government by confirming the judiciary's sole
important check on the powers of the other two branches.
Simplified, Marshall's reasoning proceeded along the following
lines. The federal government is one of limited or enumerated powers
set out in a written constitution. Marshall asked, "To what purpose
are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed
to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those in-
tended to be restrained?"5 Answering his own rhetorical question,
Marshall stated that "[i]t is a proposition too plain to be contested,
that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it."'"
And if the Constitution is a "superior, paramount law,"52 then "a leg-
islative act contrary to the Constitution is not law."53 Because, "[it is
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 28, at 395.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
49. Id. at 177-78.
50. Id. at 176.
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emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is,"' 54 Marshall concluded that it is up to the federal
courts to adjudicate conflicts between federal statutes and the United
States Constitution and to reject the validity-the constitutionality-
of statutes that conflict with the Constitution.
Marshall's reasoning and his conclusion in Marbury have been criti-
cized over the years by some observers. Some say that Marshall-like
Hamilton before him-simply assumed the truth of the very proposi-
tion to be proven. As we know, the United States Constitution is si-
lent on the power of judicial review. Still, as we have seen, Article III,
Section 2 does provide that the judicial power of the United States
extends to all cases arising under the Constitution. And likely, Mar-
shall and Hamilton were correct: that the framers intended the federal
courts to have this power was clear from the structure of the federal
government established under the written Constitution and the judici-
ary's role in that governmental structure.
It is indeed ironic that Marshall firmly established the power of ju-
dicial review in a case whose defendant was the United States Secre-
tary of State, James Madison, the father of the Constitution. It is a
further irony that Madison was doing the bidding of the man who ap-
pointed him, his friend, President Thomas Jefferson, who strongly op-
posed judicial review. Jefferson held to the belief that each branch of
the federal government was free to interpret for itself the limits placed
on it by the Constitution. To Jefferson, judicial review was nothing
less than constitutionally unauthorized supremacy of the judicial
branch over the two other elected branches of the federal govern-
ment.5 But, John Marshall's view on this issue prevailed over that of
Jefferson, who was Marshall's fellow Virginian, political rival, and dis-
tant cousin. By his opinion for a unanimous Supreme Court in Mar-
bury, Marshall had irrevocably established the principle of judicial
review in American constitutional law. And with Marbury, Marshall
established the foundations both for the federal judiciary as a co-equal
branch of government and for the prestige of the United States Su-
preme Court as a governmental institution. Henceforth, it would be
the Supreme Court that was the final arbiter of what the Constitution
meant.
Now that the principle of judicial review was settled, there re-
mained the following question: Over which governmental actions did
the federal courts possess the power of judicial review? In the next
quarter-century after the decision in Marbury v. Madison, under Chief
Justice John Marshall's leadership, the United States Supreme Court
provided the answer to this question. In Marbury, the Court had de-
54. Id.
55. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 26
(1997) (quoting letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 8
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 310 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1897)).
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clared that it had the power to hold the acts of the Congress unconsti-
tutional.56 In the case of Fletcher v. Peck,5 7 the Court struck down a
state statute, thus establishing the Court's power to hold unconstitu-
tional laws made by the state legislatures. In Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee,58 the Supreme Court established the principle that it had the
constitutional authority to review the actions of the states for consis-
tency not only with the federal Constitution but with federal laws and
treaties, as provided in Article III, Section 2. Petitions for review of
adverse decisions by state supreme courts on these matters could be
made directly to the United States Supreme Court. In Cohens v. Vir-
ginia,59 the Supreme Court held that its power of judicial review in-
cluded the power to review state criminal court proceedings for their
consistency with the United States Constitution.6 °
So, today, it is firmly established that the power of federal judicial
review means the following. First, the federal courts are the final arbi-
ters of the constitutionality of the actions of the other two branches of
the federal government-the acts of the Congress and the actions of
the President and his subordinates. Second, the federal courts are the
final arbiters of the constitutionality of the acts of the state legislatures
and the actions of the state governors and their subordinates. The
Supreme Court forcefully reiterated this rule as recently as 1958 in the
case of Cooper v. Aaron,61 in the face of massive Southern resistance
to its 1954 and 1955 opinions in Brown v. Board of Education6 2 deseg-
regating America's public schools. Third, the federal courts-particu-
larly the Supreme Court-have the power to review state court
proceedings, both criminal and civil, in order to determine whether
these proceedings are within the requirements of the federal
constitution.
The power of federal judicial review over the actions of the
branches of the state governments was bitterly debated in the early
period of American constitutional government. However, with hind-
sight, this power is not very remarkable if we remember two things.
First, the principle of judicial review of federal legislative acts was
firmly established as a foundation in 1803 by the opinion in Marbury
v. Madison.3 Second, Article VI of the Constitution contains the so-
called Supremacy Clause. This clause makes the Constitution, laws,
and treaties of the United States the supreme law of the land, notwith-
56. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 137.
57. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
58. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
59. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
60. For a general discussion of Fletcher v. Peck, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, and
Cohens v. Virgina, see JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 14-16 (6th ed. 2000).
61. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
62. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
63. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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standing any contrary provisions in the laws or the constitutions of the
states.64 Therefore, if the federal courts are indeed the final arbiters
of what the United States Constitution means and have the power to
declare unconstitutional all governmental actions that exceed consti-
tutional limitations, then surely this power of judicial review must in-
clude the power to review the constitutionality of the actions of
government at every level.65
At this point, we would do well to remind ourselves of the checks
that exist in favor of the other two branches of the federal government
against this awesome power of judicial review. As we have seen, these
checks are rather limited. They are two in number: first, the presiden-
tial power of appointment of federal judges, subject to Senate confir-
mation; and second, the congressional power to impeach and remove
a federal judge (as other federal officers) for "Treason, Bribery, or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. ' 66 These are the only two
checks against the judiciary that are possessed by the other two
branches-the elected branches of the federal government.
The only other check against the federal courts' power of judicial
review is internal-review of lower federal court decisions by the
United States Supreme Court, and ultimately, a sense of judicial self-
restraint among the justices of that high court. As we are about to
see, there have been times when this sense of judicial self-restraint
seems all but to have disappeared. Such times raise the real possibility
of a constitutional crisis, as the delicate balance of power among the
three branches of the federal government is upset. Before discussing
the case of Bush v. Gore as a possible example of this phenomenon, I
would like to examine the most famous-and most serious-example
of this phenomenon in United States constitutional history, the fight
over substantive, economic due process.
The 5th67 and 14th 68 Amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion contain the two "due process" clauses. The 5th Amendment pro-
hibits the federal government from depriving any person of "life,
liberty, or property without due process of law."' 69 (Note how these
words echo those of Locke and Jefferson.) The 14th Amendment con-
tains the same prohibition against the state governments. 70 But what
are the people's liberties that cannot be denied by the federal or state
governments? Certainly there are express limitations on state and
federal governments that are contained in the United States Constitu-
tion, particularly the Bill of Rights. Included among these rights of
64. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
65. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 60, at 16-21.
66. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
69. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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the people protected by the Bill of Rights are freedom of speech, free-
dom of religion, and freedom of the press found in the Constitution's
1st Amendment.71 Also among these are the rights of persons who
are under investigation for, or who are charged with, commission of a
crime. These guarantees are found in the 4th,72 5th,73 6th, 4 and 8th75
Amendments to the Constitution. Thus, some of the express "liberty"
interests protected by the two due process clauses are procedural in
nature and some are substantive.
Might there be some substantive liberty interests protected by the
two due process clauses that are not expressed in the Constitution but,
rather, are merely implied? After all, the 9th Amendment 76 seems to
indicate just that: there are rights retained by the people other than
those enumerated in the Constitution. Beginning in the last quarter of
the nineteenth century, the United States Supreme Court began the
process of discovering one of these rights retained by the people and
protected by the due process clauses but not enumerated in the Con-
stitution. The Court inferred that there was an implied liberty interest
freely to enter into a contract, particularly involving one's labor. In a
long series of cases, handed down over six decades, the Supreme
Court developed this doctrine, using it to invalidate, as unconstitu-
tional, numerous federal and state laws regulating economic matters.
So, using its power of judicial review, the Court struck down, for ex-
ample, many state (and a few federal) laws seeking to protect employ-
ees against overlong work hours77 and substandard wages.78
This era, when the Court-created "liberty" of substantive, economic
due process was in the ascendancy, is often called the "Lochner Era,"
after the most famous Supreme Court decision of the period, Lochner
v. New York. 79 The Lochner case was decided in 1905. In its opinion,
the Supreme Court held that a New York law protecting bakery em-
ployees from having to work more than six, ten-hour days each week
violated the freedom to purchase or sell one's labor in any way that
the employee and the employer found mutually acceptable.80 Effec-
tively, the Court was saying that economic regulation by the federal or
state governments could not go too far. If such regulation did go too
far, it violated this freedom of contract that the Court somehow in-
ferred existed in the due process clauses in the 5th and 14th Amend-
ments. Using its power of judicial review, the Court had set itself up
71. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
74. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
75. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
76. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
77. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
78. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
79. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45.
80. Id. at 64.
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in the business of determining when governmental regulation of eco-
nomic affairs crossed the invisible line separating permissible from im-
permissible-the constitutional from the unconstitutional.
In a bitter dissent in Lochner, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes criti-
cized the majority's opinion. In Holmes's view, the majority of the
Court was using the Constitution to enshrine a particular economic
theory-one that the majority of the nation did not agree with.
Holmes believed that the will of the majority, as expressed in law by
the people's legislative representatives, should prevail unless the chal-
lenged statute infringes "fundamental principles as they have been un-
derstood by the traditions of our people and our law."81 Most
economic regulation did not infringe these fundamental principles
and, therefore, was perfectly constitutional according to Holmes.
As the Lochner Era of substantive, economic due process and free-
dom of contract marched forward, an increasing number of observers
came to believe that the federal judiciary-especially the Supreme
Court-had overstepped the boundaries separating judicial from leg-
islative power. To these observers, the Court was abusing its power of
judicial review. No longer was it merely reviewing economic regula-
tion for constitutionality; instead, it was reviewing the wisdom of such
laws. This was a job for the legislative branch of government, state
and federal, not one for the federal judiciary.
This constitutional controversy reached its climax in the 1930s as
the United States was mired in the worst economic depression in the
nation's history. Governments-both state and federal-tried to en-
gage in regulation of business, labor, and agriculture in an effort to
alleviate human misery and to speed the nation's economic recovery.
On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court frustrated these efforts
by using the economic due process doctrine to strike down these laws.
Exasperated, the United States President, Franklin Roosevelt, asked
the Congress to enact legislation to increase the size of the Supreme
Court from nine justices to fifteen. This legislation would have al-
lowed Roosevelt to appoint six new justices to the Court. Presumably,
these new justices would agree with his views and would reject the
doctrine of substantive due process as a basis for invalidating state and
federal economic regulation.
Roosevelt had hit upon an interesting-and perfectly constitu-
tional-idea. The Constitution does not specify the number of justices
who must serve on the United States Supreme Court. Indeed, in the
nation's first century, Congress had by statute varied that number
from as few as six to as many as ten justices. But, since 1869, the
number of justices had remained unchanged at nine-the very same
number that serve today.
81. Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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The constitutional crisis-the showdown-over judicial review had
come. On the one side, the United States Supreme Court had as-
sumed virtually the role of a legislature, second-guessing the wisdom
of governmental regulation of business and the economy. On the
other side, the executive branch had asked the legislative branch to
check the power of the Court to use judicial review in this way. The
method of this check was not prohibited by the Constitution; it was to
"pack" the Court with additional justices appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Senate. For the Court to continue unchanged in
its ways would mean that the balance of power would continue to tilt
too far in favor of the unelected judiciary as against the other two
elected branches of the federal government. But for Roosevelt to pre-
vail in his plan to add justices to the Supreme Court might mean that
the balance of power would tilt too far away from the federal courts as
the ultimate guardians of the people's rights.
The resolution came in 1937 when the Congress refused to pass the
bill to increase the size of the Supreme Court. At precisely the same
time, the Court began a rapid retreat from the use of the substantive,
economic due process doctrine as a ground for invalidating federal or
state legislation. In fact, in the years since 1937, never again has the
Supreme Court expressly relied upon substantive, economic due pro-
cess as the basis for holding legislation unconstitutional. By the time
it decided Ferguson v. Skrupa" in 1963, the Court had made clear its
repudiation of this doctrine as the foundation for judicial review of
governmental economic regulation. There was no doubt that the
Lochner Era had long since passed away.
During this same period, beginning in the late 1930s, the Supreme
Court began to infer or discover a number of fundamental personal
rights that it believed the due process clauses protected from govern-
mental interference. At the same time it was rejecting a fundamental
right to freedom of contract, the Court was starting to recognize a
fundamental personal right to privacy. As a result, the Court held
unconstitutional certain federal and state laws regulating such matters
as family planning,83 familial relations,84 and medical procedures and
care. 5 Thus, at least sometimes, the Court continues to protect from
governmental regulation some fundamental rights that it finds are im-
plied by the Constitution, even though liberty of contract is no longer
among these protected rights.
Of course, the Supreme Court still protects personal rights-liberty
interests-that are expressed in the Constitution. Among these rights
is the right to equal protection of the laws. This right is expressly
guaranteed by the 14th Amendment as against the states, and the
82. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
83. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
84. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
85. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Court has held that it is implicitly guaranteed by the 5th Amendment
as against the federal government.86 It is important to understand
that equal protection does not mean that the government must always
treat all persons the same way. What it means is that when the gov-
ernment draws lines distinguishing categories of people, as most law-
making does, it must do so in a rational manner. When government
classifies, it must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. If the government
has a rational basis for drawing a particular line in a particular way, it
may do so, and the federal courts may not disturb the governmental
action.87 However, there is an important exception to this deferential
standard for judicial review of governmental line-drawing. The fed-
eral courts will more closely examine, or strictly scrutinize, govern-
mental classifications that are based on such characteristics as race,
ethnicity, or gender.88 The federal courts will also strictly scrutinize
governmental classifications that infringe express constitutional rights,
such as freedom of religion, speech, or press.8 9 In these instances, in
order to prevent invidious discrimination by the majority against the
minority, the government must demonstrate that there was a particu-
larly compelling reason to draw the line the way it did and that this
line was drawn in the least intrusive possible way. 9°
III.
I come now to Bush v. Gore,91 the case that put an end to our re-
cent, disputed presidential election. The Supreme Court's decision in
this case, based on equal protection grounds, effectively decided the
election in favor of George W. Bush. I want to spend the rest of my
allotted time speaking about this case and some of the reaction to it.
There are many ways that one can approach this case, but I do not
want to become too heavily bogged down in the minute details of the
facts of the case. These involve specific interpretation of federal and
state election statutes, which is beyond the scope of my presentation.
Instead, I want to focus on the case as an excellent example of many
of the matters I have discussed here today.
Many of the facts in Bush v. Gore are not obscure but are well
known to the general public. In the United States, we select our Presi-
dent by means of a system called the "electoral college." Article II,
Section 1 of the Constitution-as amended by the 12th Amendment
92
and supplemented by the federal election laws-establishes this mech-
86. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
87. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 60, at 638-44.
88. Id. Classifications based on gender are subject to so-called "intermediate" ju-




91. 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000).
92. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
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anism for choosing the President. Under this process, each state is
allotted a certain number of electors, who officially elect the President
and the Vice President of the United States. The number of electors
for each state is equal to the total number of United States senators
and representatives assigned to that state. Article II, Section 1 leaves
it to the state legislatures to determine the manner of choosing the
state's electors for President and Vice President.93
As everyone knows, our 2000 presidential election was very close-
in terms of both the total national popular vote (which does not count
in electing the President) and the electoral college vote (which is the
only vote that does count in electing the President). When the final,
official electoral vote was announced, Bush had 271 votes to Gore's
267. The minimum number necessary to elect the President is 270
electoral votes, and no state has fewer than three votes in the electoral
college. Thus, if any state's electoral college votes were switched from
Bush to Gore, Gore would have been elected President of the United
States, and Bush would still be the governor of my home state, Texas.
The disputed state of Florida has twenty-five electoral votes, enough
to have given Gore a relatively comfortable victory, had he won those
votes.
As I have said, each state has the constitutional authority-and
duty-to determine by law the method of choosing its electors. And,
for over 100 years, the law of every state has provided that the state's
electors will be chosen by the vote of its people. So, when I go to the
polls in my home state of Texas and mark my ballot for Al Gore or for
George Bush, what I am really doing is casting my vote for a slate of
electors who are committed to vote for the candidate of my choice.
Whichever presidential candidate wins the state's popular vote would
see his slate of electors chosen by the people of that state, and those
electors would almost certainly vote for him on December 18, when
the electoral college physically meets and casts the decisive, official
vote for President and Vice President.
Florida is no different from Texas or any other state as to this gen-
eral process. However, the popular vote in Florida was so close that
the state's election laws provided for an automatic, machine recount
of the vote. Bush was ahead of Gore in Florida's popular vote before
the recount, and after the first recount Bush remained ahead, al-
though his lead was diminished. Ultimately, the results of this first
recount effectively were controlling; Bush won Florida's twenty-five
electoral votes, and with them the United States presidency.
But, not surprisingly, Gore was unhappy with the results of the first
recount. The initial vote totals showed that Bush led Gore by less
than 2,000 votes out of almost 6 million votes cast statewide. After
the first recount of votes, Bush's lead was cut to less than 1,000 votes.
93. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
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Gore believed that there were many irregularities in the voting pro-
cess throughout the state of Florida. He filed suit in state court seek-
ing to have a second recount, this one by hand, of many of the ballots
cast by the people of Florida. An extremely complex series of judicial
cases and appeals followed, with the Florida Supreme Court ulti-
mately giving Gore most of the relief he requested and ordering the
hand recounts to proceed. Bush asked the United States Supreme
Court to intervene and to order the Florida Supreme Court to stop
the manual recount. The case of Bush v. Gore94 involved United
States Supreme Court judicial review of: (1) the interpretation of fed-
eral and state election laws; (2) the election process for the United
States President; (3) state executive action in certifying an election
with a federal impact; and (4) state judicial action taken in connection
with the contested election. In other words, the case involved review
of all categories of governmental action at the state and federal levels
that the Supreme Court had long held to be subject to federal judicial
review.
In its decision in Bush v. Gore, the United States Supreme Court,
by a 5-4 vote, gave George Bush exactly the relief he sought-an or-
der to stop the second, manual recount of the Florida ballots. Simpli-
fied, the Supreme Court's reasoning went this way: (1) once state law
gives state residents the right to vote for presidential electors, this
right to vote becomes a fundamental constitutional right; (2) when
state actions draw lines in ways that have a negative impact on funda-
mental rights, they are subject to strict judicial scrutiny; (3) in this
case, neither Florida law nor the Florida courts had articulated a clear
standard for conducting the second (manual) recount that would en-
sure that every vote was fairly and properly counted in an equal man-
ner; (4) therefore, the second recount, the manual recount, violated
the 14th Amendment's requirement of equal protection and funda-
mental fairness of treatment-due process-for every voter in the
state.95 The United States Supreme Court could have sent the case
back to the Florida Supreme Court to fashion an order that would
ensure that the manual recount would meet equal protection and due
process standards. There was only one problem with this solution: in
effect, time had all but run out, as the December 18 deadline and an
earlier December 12 deadline, both set by federal law, had arrived.
Therefore, the second recount, the manual recount, was invalid, and
there was not sufficient time to start it again and still comply with the
94. Bush, 121 S. Ct. at 525.
95. Id. at 529-32. Admittedly, this is an over-simplification of the Court's reason-
ing in this case. For present purposes, however, it suffices. For a more thorough
review of the 2000 presidential election, see Lynn H. Rambo, The Lawyer's Role in
Selecting the President: A Complete Legal History of the 2000 Election, 8 TEX. WES-
LEYAN L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2002).
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equal protection and due process requirements of the United States
Constitution.
For our purposes today, I would like to focus on one particular
opinion written in this case. This case spawned a number of opinions:
the Court's majority opinion, one concurrence, and four dissents-
one from each of the four dissenters. I would like to focus for a few
minutes on the dissent written by Justice Stephen Breyer because
much of what he says is most relevant to my topic today. Breyer be-
lieved that Bush v. Gore presented a non-justiciable political question.
He believed, therefore, that the Court should have dismissed the case
without reaching its merits.
According to Breyer, both the United States Constitution and fed-
eral law make clear that it is the role of the Congress-not the federal
courts-to decide disputed presidential elections. I would like to
quote him at some length:
Of course, the selection of the President is of fundamental na-
tional importance. But that importance is political, not legal. And
this Court should resist the temptation unnecessarily to resolve tan-
gential legal disputes, where doing so threatens to determine the
outcome of the election.
S.. However awkward or difficult it may be for Congress to re-
solve difficult electoral disputes, Congress, being a political body,
expresses the people's will far more accurately than does an
unelected Court. And the people's will is what elections are
about.96
Breyer believes that the issue is something rather like a non-justicia-
ble political question and should be resolved by the people's elected
representatives, not the unelected judiciary.97 Recall that one of the
major disputes about judicial review centered around the proper role
of an unelected judiciary in a democracy.
Breyer concludes by saying, "I fear that in order to bring this
agonizingly long election process to a definitive conclusion, we have
not adequately attended to that necessary 'check upon our own exer-
cise of power,' 'our own sense of self-restraint."' 98 Justice Brandeis
once said of the Court, "[t]he most important thing we do ... is not
doing." 99 "What it does today, the Court should have left undone."1 °
Breyer makes another important point here: the main check on the
96. Id. at 555-56 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
97. Breyer posits that to decide this case the Court risks becoming involved "in
partisan conflict, thereby undermining respect for the judicial process." Id. at 557
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
98. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 79
(1936) (Stone, J., dissenting)).
99. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 71 (1962) (quoting Justice Brandeis).
100. Bush, 121 S. Ct. at 558 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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unelected federal judiciary exercising its power of judicial review is
the judges' own sense of self-restraint. Because Breyer believes that
this case presents a non-justiciable political question, he thinks the Su-
preme Court should have exercised that self-restraint and dismissed
the case without deciding the merits. Recall the words of the Court in
Ex parte McCardle, quoted earlier: "judicial duty is not less fitly per-
formed by declining ungranted jurisdiction than in exercising firmly
that which the Constitution and the laws confer." '' Or, in the words
of Justice Louis D. Brandeis, as quoted by Justice Breyer, often, the
most important thing the United States Supreme Court can do is "not
doing."'0 2 I agree with Breyer's general observations and with his le-
gal conclusion. Had I been a member of the Supreme Court, I would
have joined his dissent.
Our discussion of Bush v. Gore brings us back not only to the doc-
trine of judicial review but also to the larger matter of the rule of law
in the United States. Many legal scholars, political scientists, journal-
ists, and other observers thought that the Supreme Court's 5-4 deci-
sion in Bush v. Gore was essentially a political decision. Many agreed
with Justice Breyer that the Court should have stayed out of this mat-
ter. Some observers have said that only time will tell whether the Su-
preme Court did the right thing to decide the case as it did. Maybe
the Court will be applauded at some future date for not avoiding a
difficult case and for making a decision that averted a larger constitu-
tional crisis. Alternatively, maybe the Court's prestige will suffer be-
cause many people believe that it improperly used its power of judicial
review in deciding this case, as it once did when it created the doctrine
of substantive, economic due process during the long Lochner Era,
many years ago. But, like it or not, Al Gore, the loser in the United
States Supreme Court, accepted the Court's decision as the final word
in the matter. This, he must do under the American system of the rule
of law.
Among the millions of words written about the disputed presiden-
tial election and the too numerous lawsuits that it generated, the most
thoughtful article I read was a column written by the journalist
Thomas Friedman and published in the New York Times on December
15, 2000.103 Friedman agreed that the Supreme Court's decision in
Bush v. Gore appeared to be political. Nevertheless, regardless of the
Court's decision in this case or in any other case, Friedman stated that
the key to America's strength is our nation's adherence to the rule of
101. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 515 (1868).
102. Bush, 121 S. Ct. at 558 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 71 (1962) (quoting Justice Brandeis)).
103. Thomas L. Friedman, Foreign Affairs; Medal of Honor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
2000, at A39.
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law, "when... the recipient of the judgment accepts it, and the system
behind it, as final and legitimate." ' 4 Continued Friedman:
Only in that way-only when we reaffirm our fidelity to the legal
system, even though it rules against us-can the system endure, im-
prove and learn from its mistakes. And that was exactly what Mr.
Gore understood, bowing out with grace because, as he put it, "This
is America, and we put country before party."'
10 5
According to Friedman, the real secret to America's success is to be
found in its rule of law. As he put it in his column:
That secret is not Wall Street, and it's not Silicon Valley, it's not the
Air Force and it's not the Navy, it's not the free press and it's not
the free market-it is the enduring rule of law and institutions that
underlie them all, and that allows each to flourish no matter who is
in power.
10 6
The real strength of the United States comes from what Friedman
calls its "remarkable system of laws and institutions we have inher-
ited-a system, they say, that was designed by geniuses so it could be
run by idiots.'
0 7
Perhaps it is best to end here, with Tom Friedman's insightful obser-
vations fresh in our minds. Judicial review is the foundation for the
central role of the federal judiciary in the American system of govern-
ment. And the role of the judiciary-and respect for its decisions,
even though we might disagree with the results-is the foundation for
the rule of law in the United States. Friedman expressed his hope that
one day all nations would follow Al Gore's example and pledge their
allegiance to the principle of the rule of law.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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